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Abstract
A positive relationship between socio-economic status (SES) and health, the
so-called \health-wealth gradient", is repeatedly found in most industrialized coun-
tries with similar levels of health care technology and economic welfare. This study
analyzes causality from health to wealth (health causation) and from wealth to
health (wealth or social causation) for elderly couples in the US. Using six biennial
waves of couples aged 51-61 in 1992 from the Health and Retirement Study, we
compare the recently developed strategy using Granger causality tests of Adams
et al. (2003, Journal of Econometrics) with tests for causality in dynamic panel
data models incorporating unobserved heterogeneity. While Adams et al. tests
reject the hypothesis of no causality from wealth to husband's or wife's health, the
tests in the dynamic panel data model do not provide evidence of wealth-health
causality. On the other hand, both methodologies lead to strong evidence of causal
e®ects from both spouses' health on household wealth.
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11 Introduction
Explaining the health-wealth gradient, the observed association between wealth and
health, has been a challenge for many economists as well as other social scientists. In
the United States, respondents of the 1984 wave of the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics
(PSID) who reported to be in excellent health had almost 75% higher median wealth than
those who reported fair or poor health (Smith, 1999). Ten years later the ratio between
median wealth of the same groups of respondents had grown to 274%, with median
wealth $127,900 for those who reported excellent health in 1984, and $34,700 for those
in fair or poor health in 1984 (amounts in 1996$). The ratio in 1984 was largest for the
age group 45-54, an impressive 176%, which increased to 264% in 1994. Although often
less pronounced than in the United States, a similar relation between socioeconomic
status (SES) and health (the "health-SES gradient"), is found in most industrialized
countries with similar levels of health care technology and economic welfare (Wilkinson,
1996).
Using data from the PSID, Deaton and Paxson (1998) show that the correlation
between income and self-reported health increases over the life-cycle until about age
60 while the variance in self-reported health outcomes increases systematically over the
life-cycle. Adda (2003) ¯nds similar results for Sweden, with a health-wealth correlation
that peaks at about the same age. In the United Kingdom, one of the puzzles created by
the widely cited Whitehall I (1967) and II (1985-1988) studies (Marmot, 1999) looking
at the health of civil servants over three decades, is that, among these individuals of
similar socioeconomic status, the health-SES gradient, which was already substantial in
1967, has further increased over time, despite rising real median wealth and increasing
e®orts to facilitate access to health care (Smith, 1999). A similarly challenging ¯nding is
the evidence of Deaton and Paxson (1998) that, controlling for age, health assessments
show no signi¯cant increases and even tend to decrease slightly for men and women
born after 1945, even though, on average, these cohorts live longer and are wealthier
than earlier cohorts.
Understanding the sources of the gradient is important in order to understand the
sources of health inequalities and to design economic policy measures to improve welfare,
health and well-being. Curbing health inequalities may be desirable for many reasons.
Deaton and Paxson (1998) argue that a mean-preserving spread in the health distribution
leads to increasing mortality and reduced welfare under the plausible assumption that
the marginal e®ect of health changes on mortality is higher at the bottom of the health
distribution where individuals are more fragile and exposed to risks. Pradhan et al.
(2003) argue that a social welfare function should have health as an argument and
should be concave in that argument, if poor health is a stronger sign of deprivation
of capabilities than income, in which case health becomes intrinsically important as
opposed to instrumentally signi¯cant.
Another reason why the gradient is important, is the relation between health, retire-
ment, and incentives of social security bene¯ts and health insurance. Health (measured
from bad to good) is positively related to household savings, labor force participation,
2and earnings, and negatively related to the social security retirement bene¯ts replace-
ment rate. Availability of Medicare at age 65 may explain the retirement peak at that
age, where social security incentives no longer apply (Rust and Phelan, 1997; Blau and
Gilleskie, 2001). Since the importance of public health insurance depends on health as
well as SES, the health-SES relations are relevant for the debate on universal health care
and the e±ciency of proposed reforms.
Attempts to understand the di®erent causal e®ects ("pathways") through which so-
cioeconomic status and health a®ect each other have been numerous (see Smith, 1999
and Adler et al., 1994 for reviews). To understand the sources of the health-wealth or
health-SES gradient, it is important to realize that health and wealth are dynamic pro-
cesses that evolve over an individual's life-cycle. A large part of the life-cycle is subject
to the history of a series of shocks and events on the health and wealth front. Some of
these are under the individual's control and others are completely unpredictable.
Pathways from health to wealth have been emphasized by economists, relying on
the human capital theory by Grossman (1972), where health is seen as a stock that
is built up through investment.1 Health is worth investing in since it yields utility: it
extends life and therefore the horizon over which gains from productivity can be used
for consumption and provides consumption of healthy days that can be enjoyed through
leisure (as opposed to sick days which do not yield utility). At a given point of the
individual's life-cycle, the health stock is the result of investments and shocks from the
individual's past, implying that as one progresses over the life-cycle, health is more and
more predetermined by the complete past of the individual.
The relation between health and wealth can be explained in this framework. Health
and expectations about future health can a®ect productivity and hourly wages as well
as labor supply at the intensive and the extensive margin. It therefore drives the ca-
pacity to accumulate savings for retirement, and a®ects the retirement decision both in
this way and through the direct e®ect of health on the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and work. Moreover, health a®ects expenditures directly, particularly
in the United States where about 20% of workers below 65 are not covered by health
insurance (Gruber, 1998), and where even those who are covered will often face copay-
ments or additional expenditures such as prescription drugs not covered by Medicare.
Consequently, health events can lead to considerable revisions of saving plans or other
life-cycle decisions such as bequests (Smith, 2003). Causal e®ects from health to wealth
are also referred to as health causation.2
Pathways from wealth or more generally from socioeconomic status to health have
been studied extensively in other social sciences (Adler et al., 1994) and since recently
also in economics (Adams et al., 2003; Adda, 2003; Hurd and Kapteyn, 2003; Meer et al.,
2003; Smith, 2003). This causal link is often named social causation which we will refer
to as SES or wealth causation, the opposite of health causation. Theories explaining such
a link have been put forward in various ¯elds, such as biology, psychology, and economics.
For example, one explanation is risk behaviors: the relation between behavior that is
1see Dustmann and Windmeijer (1999) for an empirical application of the Grossman model.
2This is often referred as health selection in the social science literature.
3detrimental to health like smoking and drinking and socioeconomic status (Marmot,
1999).
The e®ect of health on wealth may be related to access to health care. If not all
people are fully covered by the same health insurance or if there are copayments or
deductibles, those with low income or wealth will consume less health care services (in
quantitative or qualitative terms) and thus invest less in their health. This cannot
explain, however, why in the United Kingdom the wealth-health gradient has increased
over a period in which general access to health care has increased, as shown by the two
Whitehall studies. Moreover, it is hard to reconcile this explanation with the evidence
provided by the RAND health experiment (Newhouse, 1993), which, in an experiment
with randomly assigned copayment rates, showed that those with lower copayment rates
used on average more health care services but did not experience signi¯cantly di®erent
health outcomes. The variation in quality of care and treatments that one can obtain
in di®erent socioeconomic groups may be even more important to this issue than access
to health care services per se. Indeed, the Grossman health production model implies
that the marginal bene¯ts of investment in health care can rise with education level (an
indicator of socioeconomic status), explaining why the demand for health care quality
increases with SES. Still, Kenkel (1991) ¯nds that only part of the relationship between
schooling and health is explained by real di®erences in health knowledge.
Another potential causal e®ect of wealth on health through wealth inequalities comes
from the stress associated with being at the bottom of the distribution (Wilkinson,
1996). In the Whitehall study, Marmot (1999) shows that there is some evidence that
civil servants in higher ranks have lower level of cholesterol than those in lower ranks,
suggesting that a low wealth position may create additional stress. The observation
that wealth inequalities have risen but that the average health level may have fallen (as
found by Deaton and Paxson, 1998) would be in line with this e®ect, as is Wilkinson's
(1996) ¯nding that countries with higher wealth inequality tend to have higher mortality
rates. A way to think of the e®ect of stress is to consider the adaptation of the health
system to a series of stressful events. The immune system may adapt by functioning
at a more intensive level, which may in the long run be detrimental to blood pressure
and the health system. Episodes of stress such as the loss of a job may then in the long
run lead to higher incidence of cardiovascular disease or high blood pressure. Since the
frequency of stressful events di®ers across SES groups, allostatic loads, a measure of the
cumulative e®ect of stressful events on the health system (see, e.g., Seeman et al., 1997),
will be di®erent across SES groups .
A ¯nal set of explanations of the health-wealth gradient refers to early childhood.
Small health events at the beginning of life may a®ect an individual's complete health
trajectory over the life-cycle (Barker, 1997). Following a sample of the March-1946
birth cohort in the UK over nearly 50 years, Wadsworth and Kuh (1997) found that
early childhood events such as poor living conditions were signi¯cant predictors of many
diseases later in life. Moreover, they showed that children of age two from this 1946
cohort had a higher risk of developing bronchitis if their parents had a similar childhood
condition or smoked as adults, implying that health is partly transmitted from the
4previous generation. Lindeboom et al. (2003) found that macroeconomic conditions
at birth a®ected mortality hazards of cohorts throughout the 19th and 20th century,
highlighting the importance (the \reach" in terms of Smith, 1999) of early childhood
environment. Ravelli et al. (1998) showed that children born during the 1944-45 famine
in Amsterdam were more likely to develop diabetes later in life. These examples show
that health is partly determined by health of the parents or health in early childhood,
which will be related to the parents' SES due to the causal links from SES to health
discussed above. Since there is also a strong intergenerational e®ect of SES, this can
explain part of the health-SES gradient later in life. In our analysis of people aged
¯fty and over, such e®ects arise as permanent health shifts throughout the observation
window. We will model them as individual speci¯c health e®ects re°ecting unobserved
heterogeneity. Similar persistent unobserved heterogeneity terms may drive household
wealth, and the unobserved heterogeneity terms in household wealth and in health of
both spouses can be correlated.
The goal of this paper is to disentangle the sources of the health-wealth gradient:
causal e®ects from health to wealth (health causation), causal e®ects from wealth to
health (wealth or SES causation), observed exogenous factors that a®ect health and
wealth in the same way, and correlated unobserved factors (unobserved heterogeneity)
driving health as well as wealth. Panel data with extensive information on wealth
and health o®er a non-experimental setting in which causality can be addressed using
common time series concepts of non-causality and conditional independence (Granger,
1969; Sims, 1972). If correlation between unobservables plays a role, these tests will
only be valid if they control for such correlations (Chamberlain, 1984).
Using Granger causality to study the health-wealth gradient was proposed by Adams
et al. (2003), who test for an e®ect of wealth on health in the AHEAD cohort of age 70
and older. They only have three waves, limiting the richness of the dynamic speci¯cations
they can use. Moreover, they do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. Their results
indicate a clear health causation channel but they also ¯nd some evidence of wealth/SES
causation. They point out that rejecting their hypothesis of no Granger causality could
also be an indication of correlated unobserved heterogeneity in health and wealth. Adda
(2003) uses Swedish panel data for individuals over the whole life-cycle and implements
a test for health and SES causation. He concludes that both causation mechanisms are
present. He does not discuss or control for unobserved heterogeneity.
On the other hand, Smith (2003) and Wu (2003) perform tests of health causation
conditional on initial conditions. Since the initial values are correlated to the unob-
servable heterogeneity terms, this goes in the direction of controlling for unobservables.
They estimate the impact of onsets of critical health conditions such as cancer or lung
disease on changes in wealth and other SES indicators, conditioning on initial health
status. Smith (2003) looks at changes between the ¯rst and the ¯fth wave of the HRS,
while Wu (2003) looks at changes over the ¯rst two waves. Using onsets as exogenous
health shocks that are not a®ected by wealth changes seems a plausible identi¯cation
strategy. Smith (2003) estimates that the cumulative e®ect of the onset of a critical
disease after eight years is about $40,000, while Wu (2003) concludes that household
5wealth responds more strongly to the onset of a serious condition for the wife than for
the husband. Neither Smith (2003) nor Wu (2003) exploit the full panel nature of the
HRS, implying that the dynamics of health and SES causation are not explored.
Using a similar strategy to test for causal wealth-health e®ects, Meer et al. (2003)
use three 5-year spaced observations from the PSID, using bequests as instruments
that directly a®ect wealth but not health. Their test looks at the e®ect of wealth
changes on self-reported health and the dynamics of their model imply that wealth
changes have a one shot e®ect on health after which health returns to a stationary
value. They ¯nd small and insigni¯cant wealth-health e®ects. Adams et al. (2003)
reject the hypothesis that wealth changes do not cause health changes for three of the
four main causes of death among older men, as well as for self-reported general health
status and for mental health. The latter results for the U.S. are also found by Adda
et al. (2003) for the U.K. and Sweden. Using roughly similar models as Adams et al.
(2003), Hurd and Kapteyn (2003) ¯nd that changes in health are more related to income
in the U.S. than in the Netherlands. In all these three studies, a test of non-causality is
performed without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. As argued above, correlated
unobserved heterogeneity may be important, because of genetic transmissions and early
childhood e®ects and other persistent shocks on health as well as wealth. Not allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity may bias the estimates and the test results, possibly explaining
why the null of no causality is often rejected.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic vector autoregressive panel data framework that
makes it possible to test for health and wealth causation, controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) emphasize that dynamic vector au-
toregressive panel data models o®er a rich environment for performing such tests. We
apply the framework to the HRS cohort of elderly households born between 1931 and
1941 who are observed over six biennial waves from 1992 to 2002. We consider health
for each spouse but wealth at the household level, analyzing the interplay of health and
wealth for elderly couples (as in Wu, 2003). We use the instruments of Smith (2003),
Wu (2003) and Meer et al. (2003) to identify the structural links between health and
wealth, conditioning on initial conditions. We perform the tests and explore their sen-
sitivity to di®erent sets of assumptions, particularly concerning the types of dynamic
feedback allowed for and the speci¯cation of the initial conditions (Ahn and Schmidt,
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). We also present some results where we separately look
at mental and physical health, distinguish between couples that do and do not have
access to health insurance, and look at liquid and non-liquid wealth.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we document the association between
wealth and health and the way it evolves over time for the HRS cohort. In section 3,
the econometric framework is presented and the identi¯cation, testing and estimation
strategies are discussed. Section 4 presents the results of the Adams et al. (2003)
tests and Section 5 presents the results for the dynamic panel data models. Section 6
concludes. Some more detailled results can be found in appendices at the end of the
paper.
62 Wealth and Health in the HRS cohort
The Health and Retirement Study is a longitudinal survey of individuals aged 51-61 in
1992 in the United States. The project started in 1990 and was funded by the National
Institute on Aging and other partners such as the Social Security Administration. Data
were collected every two years and cover a wide range of aspects of the life of elderly
singles and couples. For the ¯rst wave of 1992, 12,652 interviews were conducted for a
random sample of individuals born 1931-1941. Spouses of these individuals were also
included in the sample even if they were not eligible according to their age.
We use the public release ¯le from the RAND corporation that merged records from
the six available waves (1992-2002).3 Data is arranged by couples consisting of respon-
dent and spouse. We select all couples present in 1992 with complete information on
the relevant variables during their participation in the HRS. To avoid losing too many
observations, we retain observations with missing information or bracket information on
one or more components of wealth, using imputed values (see below).
We observe couples until one of the spouses dies, until the dissolution of the household
because of divorce or separation, or until one member of the household is not interviewed.
We do not analyze widows and widowers or divorced or separated spouses, since we focus
on the interplay between wealth and the health of the two spouses in a couple.
Table 1 gives the frequencies at each wave along with the recorded exits from our
sample. Overall, the average attrition rate for each wave is roughly 10% which gives an
annual attrition rate of about 5%.4 In 1992, there are 4,160 households of which 2,463
remain until the sixth wave in 2002.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 2 shows the demographic composition of the sample in 1992 according to the
number of waves the respondents remain in the panel. Wives are on average four years
younger than their husband. Both spouses have a similar average level of education.
Approximately 6% of respondents are Hispanic and about 8% are blacks. These ¯gures
re°ect the oversampling of those groups in the HRS. About 8% of husbands are immi-
grants, compared to 10% of the wives. One out of four respondent has been married at
least once before their current relationship.
Those who exit before the end of the panel are on average older, which is an obvious
consequence of decreasing survival probabilities. Attritors have slightly less education
than respondents who remain in the panel for all six waves. Blacks and Hispanics seem
more likely to exit than others.
[Table 2 about here]
3See http://www.rand.org/labor/aging/dataprod/. We used version D of the data released in Jan-
uary 2004.
4From life-table ¯gures, yearly death rates for this cohort vary from 0.5% to 2.6% over the decade
considered (Berkeley Mortality Database: http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality/ ).
72.1 Wealth Data
We summarize wealth in two broad categories: liquid and non-liquid wealth. Liquid
wealth consists of individual retirement accounts, stocks, bonds, certi¯cate deposits, T-
bills/saving bonds, checking/saving accounts and other debts and savings. Non-liquid
wealth includes the net value of the primary residence, other real estate, and vehicles.
This de¯nition is the same as the one used by Adams et al. (2003), except that we do not
include business assets, which is nonzero for not many respondents but varies enormously
over time for some respondents. It does not include the value of de¯ned contribution
pension plans but does include the value of life insurances and other annuities (in "other
savings"). All amounts are expressed in US dollars of 2002 using the Consumer Price
Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In the analysis, we will use log transformations
of the di®erent wealth measures to reduce the e®ect of outliers.5
Table 3 gives the composition of wealth holdings for our sample. The ¯rst column
gives the percentage of cases where imputation was used across all waves for each wealth
component. RAND Imputations are used for open and closed bracket responses and for
ownership of speci¯c items (see Hoynes et al. (1998) for a comparison of imputation
methods). The next two columns give the median of each component conditional on
ownership (with positive amount) and the ownership rates for the 1992 and 2002 waves.
In 1992, respondents held more than two thirds of their wealth in non-liquid assets,
primarily consisting of the value of the primary residence. The share of non-liquid
assets in total wealth falls over the decade.
Participation of the elderly in stocks and individual retirement accounts is far more
important in the United States than in many other countries (Hurd, 2001). More than
half of the respondents in the panel own Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), with
a median value of $31,570 in 1992. Moreover, by 2002, 37.4% of households hold stocks
for a median value of $50,000. Increases in IRA and stock holdings from 1992 to 2002
certainly re°ect to some extent the high returns observed throughout the period. Par-
ticipation went from 32.1% to 37.4% for stocks and from 45.1% to 47.2% for IRAs from
1992 to 2002. The median value of stocks and IRAs more than doubled over the 10
years.
[Table 3 about here]
2.2 Health Variables
Table 4 summarizes the health information for the 1992 and 2002 waves. The HRS
age groups are subject to considerable health risks. In 1992, 16.7% (23.8%) of wives
(husbands) have su®ered from a condition that Smith (2003) labels a severe one: cancer,
heart condition, lung disease or a stroke (or a combination of these). More than half
the respondents have ever had an onset of a mild condition - diabetes, high blood
5To deal with zero wealth (0.5-1% of the observations per wave) and negative wealth (2-3% of
the observations per wave), we use the following log transformation: log(y) = 1(y ¸ 0)log(1 + y)
¡(1 ¡ 1(y ¸ 0))(1 ¡ log(¡y)); For positive values of wealth, this is approximately log wealth.
8pressure, arthritis, or mental problems (depression). This makes clear that these elderly
respondents have a whole health history behind them, suggesting that much of the
current association between health and wealth in the time period that the respondents
are observed may stem from their past.
[Table 4 about here]
By the end of 2002, 44.9% of husbands and 31.7% of wives had reported the onset of a
severe health condition, implying that in the 10 years covered by the survey, about one in
every ¯ve respondents experienced their ¯rst severe health condition. In 2002, 81.3% of
husbands (79.9% of wives) had experienced the onset of a mild health condition, mostly
arthritis (56.2% for husbands and 63.2% for wives) and high blood pressure (53.8% for
husbands and 49.2% for wives).
Mental health problems are much more frequent for wives (18.4% in 2002) than for
husbands (8.9% in 2002). Similar di®erences are found for the CESD scores, computed
from a series of questions measuring mental health.6 The Body-Mass Index (BMI)
increases more over time for wives than for husbands. The percentage of respondents
having di±culties with activities of daily living (ADL) also increases over time (doubles)
and is always larger for wives than for husbands. Husbands are more pessimistic with
respect to their chance of surviving up to 75 than their wives are in 1992 but this gap is
eliminated by 2002. One ¯fth of all respondents report having health problems limiting
work in 1992. This increases to one fourth in 2002.
Our analysis requires one summary measure of health. General indicators like self-
reported health convey general information about health, while the indicators for onsets
of health conditions or the CESD scores yield more speci¯c information. Adams et
al. (2003) consider each of these dimensions independently while they recognize that
all indicators are interrelated. Hurd and Kapteyn (2003) consider self-reported health
status and Smith (2003) studies serious health conditions.
We will work with a one-dimensional health indicator. Following Adda (2003), we
build a "constructed health index" (CHI) from the indicators displayed in Table 4, using
principal component analysis. This measure combines the many dimensions and indices
of health outlined in Table 4. The index is normalized such that it has mean 0 and
variance 1. Low values of the index refer to good health while high values refer to bad
health. Most factors score highly, with self-reported health and health onsets scoring
the highest.
[Table 5 about here]
In Table 5 we present the bivariate distribution of the husband's CHI and the wife's
CHI in 1992. The table shows that health of husband and wife are correlated. For
6This score is based on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CESD) scale. It gives the
sum of six negative indicators minus two positive indicators. The negative indicators measure whether
the respondent experienced the following sentiments all or most of the time: depression, everything is
an e®ort, sleep is restless, felt alone, felt sad, and could not get going. The positive indicators measure
whether the respondent felt happy and enjoyed life, all or most of the time.
9example, 36% of wives of husbands in the best health quartile are also in the best health
quartile themselves. On the other hand, only 13% of wives of respondents in the worst
health quartile are in the best health quartile. A chi-square test con¯rms that CHI-
s of both spouses are not independent (p-value < 0.001). This can be due to causal
mechanisms (e.g. stress due to a health problem of the spouse), assortative matching,
or common factors a®ecting both spouses' health in the same way (e.g. environment,
socio-economic position, risk behaviors).
2.3 Association between Wealth and Health
Table 6 reveals the health-wealth gradient in the 1992 and 2002 waves, in a similar way
as Table 1 of Smith (1999). It presents median household wealth by 1992 health quartile
(using the CHI to measure health). In 1992, median household wealth of husbands in the
best health quartile was more than twice as high as median household wealth of husbands
in the worst health quartile. For the same households, the wealth di®erence was even
larger in 2002. Median household wealth for wives in the worst health quartile in 1992
was only 40% of median household wealth for wives in the best health quartile. For the
same households, the wealth di®erential increased even further in 2002. These di®erences
are of similar magnitude as those found in Hurd and Kapteyn (2003) and Smith (1999)
using similar data source but distinguishing health categories using self-reported general
health, which has a high weight in the CHI-s. These remarkable di®erences do not only
appear at the extremes of the distribution. Even among the households with relatively
healthy wives in the second quartile in 1992, median wealth is 20 to 25% lower than
in the top health quartile. Thus the association between health and wealth is not a
simple dichotomy between "the rich and the poor" but rather a gradient that is observed
everywhere in the SES ladder.
[Table 6 about here]
3 Econometric Methodology
3.1 The Evolution of Health and Wealth
We develop a model for three outcome variables for a given couple i = m(husband)





it is health of spouse j and yit is
the log transformed value of household wealth. As explained in section 1, a model
explaining the evolution of wealth and health should have several features. First, it must
allow for instantaneous causality as well as dynamic feedback from wealth to health
and vice versa. This captures the most cited pathways, causal e®ects of wealth on
health (wealth causation) and of health on wealth (health causation). Second, it should
address whether or not health in°uences the health of the spouse, potentially trough
mental health or other channels, as possible explanations for the association between
CHI-s of both spouses, apparent from Table 5. Moreover, the model should take into
10account potentially correlated unobserved heterogeneity in health and wealth, leading
to a permanent correlation of wealth and health from the beginning of the observation
window. We will use a panel data vector autoregressive model for Yit that captures the
features discussed above and allows for the various explanations of the gradient. The
model is given by a Pth order vector autoregressive process:
¡Yit = Axit +
P X
p=1
©pYit¡p + ´i + "it (1)
The matrices ¡;A and © contain the parameters of the model. xit is a vector of
time invariant and time varying characteristics of the household (education, race, age,
etc.). These characteristics can be correlated with a vector of time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity terms ´i, which, for example, capture unobserved traits at birth such as
genes of members of the household, early childhood events (cf. Barker, 1997; Wadsworth
and Kuh, 1997) or other intergenerational factors that a®ect health and wealth. We will
allow that within each couple the three unobserved heterogeneity terms are correlated.
The transitory shocks in "it are also potentially correlated.
The matrix © contains the parameters that re°ect causal links that take some time
to become e®ective. The parameters on the e®ect of lagged wealth on health can be
seen as transmission channels for wealth causation while the parameters on the e®ect of
lagged health on wealth are indications of health causation (Adda, 2003).
Through the parameters in the matrix ¡, we also allow for instantaneous causality.
This is particularly relevant in our case since observations are spaced by two years, and
it seems unlikely that all causal links will take two years or more to become e®ective.
We also allow for instantaneous e®ects of the health of one spouse on the other
spouse's health. Such e®ects may point at direct mental or physical health links, but
since our health variables also incorporate self-reported health and subjective life ex-
pectancy, they may also mean that respondents adjust their subjective beliefs following
a deterioration in the health of their spouse.
Each component of Yit has its own dynamics propagating the e®ect of shocks and
potentially increasing their long-term impact. In order to estimate the dynamic inter-
actions between health and wealth consistently, it is crucial to incorporate a dynamic
structure that is °exible enough to describe the data. In particular, the order P of au-
toregression has to be chosen large enough. Speci¯cation tests as in Arellano and Bond
(1991) will be used for this purpose.
Since the individual e®ects are allowed to be correlated with the regressors in xit,
it will not be possible to estimate the in°uence of time-invariant regressors. For the
same reason, it is not possible to disentangle the e®ects of age and a common time
trend. For similar reasons, we will also not include variables on risk behavior (smoking,
drinking). Persistent risk behavior over the life cycle can have a causal e®ect on health
and also correlates negatively with socio-economic status. This, however, is captured by
the individual e®ects. On the other hand, the variation of risk behavior over time in the
elderly age group that we consider is likely to be endogenous: people stop smoking or
11drinking due to health problems. Indeed, in the data, very few elderly individuals start
smoking (about 1%), while more than 17% stop smoking. Incorporating risk behavior
would require instrumenting it and this is beyond the goal of the paper. Instead, it should
be kept in mind that some of the mechanisms that we ¯nd may be due to behavioral
changes.
3.2 Estimation, Identi¯cation, and Causality Tests
In this panel data setting, it is possible to test for causality taking account of the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity in ´i, avoiding the problem that the null of no
causality between health and wealth can be rejected due to "spurious correlation." We
¯rst consider the reduced form model in which instantaneous causality is eliminated,
explain how to estimate this model with GMM, and how to test for causality using
a Wald test. We then turn to the structural model with instantaneous causality and
instruments needed for identi¯cation, and discuss estimation and testing for causality in
that model also.
Tests for Reduced-Form Vector Autoregressions
Consider the reduced-form VAR of (1),
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it = ¡¡1"it. For a
test for wealth causation in the sense of Granger (1969) causality, the null hypothesis of
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i = (Yi0;:::;Yit): In model 2, this takes the form
H0 : C1;my = C1;fy = ::: = CP;my = CP;fy = 0 (4)
where Cp;my is the m;y element of the matrix Cp, the e®ect of p-periods lagged log
wealth on the husband's health, etc.













i) for t = 0;:::;T (5)
In model 2, this takes the form
H0 : C1;ym = C1;yf = ::: = CP;ym = CP;yf = 0: (6)
12Chamberlain (1984) de¯nes (3) and (5) as tests for \Granger causality conditional
on unobservables."Adams et al. (2003) perform their tests for non-causality without
conditioning on ´¤









i) for t = 0;:::;T: (7)
As Adams et al. (2003) emphasize, rejecting this null hypothesis only leads to the
conclusion that y "Granger causes" h under the maintained hypothesis that there is no
unobserved heterogeneity.






i ) = 0 for t = 2;:::;T (8)
using the reduced form VAR in (2). First-di®erencing gets rid of the unobserved het-




it¡1), implying that Yit¡1 will not be a valid instrument in the
equation in ¯rst di®erences. This is why the history up to t¡2, Y
t¡2
i ; is used as instru-
ments (following, for example, Arellano and Bond, 1991). This implies that estimation
(and testing for health-wealth or wealth-health e®ects) in this framework requires at
least three observations per household.
If the health and wealth variables are close to non-stationary, then the instruments in
(8) may be weak since past levels will not be correlated with current changes (see, e.g.,
Arellano, 2003). This may well be the case for health since, for example, "onsets ever
had" enter the constructed health index. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest using an
assumption of mean stationarity on errors and individual e®ects to add more moments
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it) = 0: (10)
Su±cient for this assumption is that E("¤
it´¤0
i ) does not depend on t (or is zero) and
that there is no serial correlation in "¤
it: The latter assumption was made already in (8)
and is justi¯ed if all correlation over time is picked up by the AR(P) structure (the matrix
©) and the unobserved heterogeneity terms. The former implies that heterogeneity can
be related to health or wealth shocks, but only in a way that does not vary over time.
As discussed in Arellano (2003), the assumption (9) given above leads to moment
conditions that are non-linear in the parameters. Under the additional assumption
E(¢xit ­ ´
¤
i) = 0; (11)
7­ denotes the Kronecker product. For two matrices A; B, of size M £N and P £Q, A­B denotes
the MP £ BQ matrix consisting of the scalar product of each element of A : Amn by the matrix B.





it)) = 0 for t = 2;:::;T (12)
Using (2), this leads to the following moments that are linear in the reduced form
parameters B and C1;:::;CP:
E(¢Yit¡1 ­ (Yit ¡ Bxit ¡
P X
p=1
CpYit¡p)) = 0 for t = 2;:::;T (13)
The additional assumption (11) seems innocuous in our case, since ¢xit only contains
time dummies (with age di®erences linear in time and other exogenous variables invariant
over time).8 We refer to (13) in addition to (8) as the reduced form VAR. As Blundell
and Bond (1998) emphasize, imposing these mean stationarity restrictions or not is a
trade-o® between robustness and e±ciency. Hence, it is important to test the additional
restrictions. We will do this using the increment in the Sargan test statistic (cf. Arellano
and Bond, 1991).
Tests for Structural Vector Autoregressions
In the structural form (1), the hypothesis of non-causality implies restrictions on both
the instantaneous e®ects in ¡ and the lagged e®ects in © similar to the restrictions in
(4). To be precise, non-causality of wealth to husband's health and wife's health implies:
H0 : ©1;my = ©1;fy =;:::;= ©P;my = ©P;fy = 0 (14)
and
H0 : ¡my = ¡fy = 0: (15)
Note that these restrictions are stronger than those for the reduced form, since the
reduced from parameters are linear combinations of the structural form parameters that
are restricted to zero under the null. Thus the causality test on the reduced form will
not have power for some violations of non-causality in the structural form.
Without imposing additional identifying assumptions, we can estimate the reduced
form parameters in (2) but not the structural parameters in ¡ and ©. Exclusion re-
strictions (i.e., instruments) are needed in order to identify the instantaneous causal
mechanisms.
Our strategy for ¯nding instruments for health and wealth is to look for shocks that
do not have direct e®ects on the other outcome. This same strategy has also been used
recently by Smith (2003), Wu (2003), and Meer et al. (2003). As instruments for health
8In principle, (13) would also identify the e®ects of time-invariant exogenous variables. Following
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999), however, we do not exploit this and do not include the time-
invariant exogenous variables xit.
14changes, we use onsets of critical health conditions. It was already documented in tables
3 and 4 that such onsets are abundant for this cohort. It seems plausible that these onsets
have no direct e®ect of wealth (other than through the health change they induce). To
instrument changes in wealth, we use inheritances. Many of the households in the sample
receive inheritances from the death of a parent or sibling (approximately 5% each wave;
the median inheritance is 29,000$ and the mean is 64,100$). While the death of a family
member might be correlated to the level of health due to genetic background or early
childhood events etc., it seems reasonable to assume that it is not directly related to
current health changes, making it an appropriate instrument for wealth changes.













fit)0 are indicators of onsets of health conditions for both spouses.
We use separate dummies for severe and mild onsets. z
y
it is a vector with two elements:
whether or not the couple received an inheritance in the last two years, and the size of
that inheritance in dollars.
To identify the instantaneous e®ect of health of one spouse on health of the other
spouse, we also use the onsets of health conditions. We thus make the plausible assump-
tion that such an onset has no direct e®ect on the other spouse other than through the
constructed health index. We will test the overidentifying restrictions it implies. The
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i ) = 0 along with (16), (17) and stationarity restrictions (13). We de-
note this model the structural VAR. Similarly to the reduced-form VAR, we can use the
incremental Sargan test to test the stationarity restrictions. Tests for "lagged" causality
essentially remain the same as (3) and (5) except that they involve the matrices ©p in-
stead of Cp. Tests for contemporaneous causation that rely on orthogonality restrictions
(16) and (17) involve testing whether elements of ¡ are zero.
Both reduced form VARs and structural VARs are estimated by GMM using moments
in levels and di®erences (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Since the cross-sectional dimension
is quite large (compared to, e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991), we use two-step GMM
estimates constructing the optimal weighting matrix from ¯rst-step estimates.
4 Adams et al. (2003) Tests
We ¯rst follow the approach of Adams et al. (2003) to test for non-causality of wealth
on health and health on wealth of couples in the HRS cohort without controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity and using only ¯rst order lags. Comparing this with the
results of causality tests conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity will show whether
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important.
154.1 Wealth to Health
To test the null hypothesis that wealth does not cause health, Tables 7 and 8 present the
results of models that explain each indicator of health of husband and wife from lagged
husband's and wife's health, lagged log wealth, and additional controls (demographics
and past risk behavior, as in Adams et al., 2003).9 We model such variables as ADLs,
CESD scores and Self-reported Health as ordered responses, onsets as binary outcomes,
and constructed health indices and self-reported probabilities of dying before age 75 as
continuous outcomes. As in Adams et al. (2003), normality of the errors is assumed for
the binary and ordered response models and the invariance property (the causal e®ect
is constant over time) is imposed.
The non-causality test is a t-test on the coe±cient of lagged log wealth. For hus-
bands, the null is rejected in seven out of eight cases. In six of these, the coe±cient is
signi¯cantly negative, implying that higher wealth leads to fewer health problems, as
expected. The signi¯cantly positive e®ect of wealth on the probability of dying before
reaching age 75 seems counter-intuitive. The e®ect of wealth on the probability of a
severe onset is negative but not signi¯cant.
The results for the wife's health are presented in Table 8. The e®ect of lagged wealth
is always negative and signi¯cant in four out of eight cases. Focusing on the constructed
health index as a summary measure of all health variables, we ¯nd evidence of wealth
causation for both husbands and wives, in line with the results of Adams et al. (2003) for
the older cohorts. Although statistically signi¯cant, the magnitude of the e®ects is quite
small. For example, having twice as much lagged wealth would reduce the probability of
a severe onset for wives by about 0.4 percentage-points, keeping other variables constant.
Tables 7 and 8 can also be used to test for non-causality of the wife's health on the
husband's health and vice versa (controlling for household wealth etc.). This is a t-test
on the coe±cient of the spouse's health. In four out of eight cases, we ¯nd a positive
and signi¯cant e®ect of the wife's health on the husband's health. In the other four
cases, the e®ect is insigni¯cant. The e®ect of the husband's health on the wife's health
is signi¯cantly positive in ¯ve out of eight cases. Focusing on the constructed health
index, we ¯nd evidence of causality in both directions.
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here]
4.2 Health to Wealth
Table 9 presents the regressions underlying tests for non-causality of health to wealth.
Both log wealth and the hyperbolic transformation of wealth proposed by Adams et al.
(2003) are used. The column "levels" presents the OLS results. To account for outliers
in the log wealth distribution, we also present some robust regression results. Although
this leads to somewhat lower t-values, the main conclusion remains the same: health
9We experimented with more speci¯cations, more lagged health variables, etc. In general, the test
results do not change much and qualitative conclusions remain the same.
16problems of both husband and wife lead to a signi¯cant reduction in household wealth,
so that non-causality from health to wealth is clearly rejected, in line with the results of
Adams et al. (2003).
[ Insert Table 9 about here]
4.3 Attrition and Invariance
We know from tables 2 and 4 that those who die or for other reasons leave the panel before
2002 have poorer health outcomes and on average lower schooling (specially husbands) {
an indicator of lower socioeconomic status. This suggests that attrition may also a®ect
the relation between health and wealth outcomes and the outcomes of the causality tests.
Comparing estimates of the equations explaining the health index for the unbalanced
sample and for the balanced sample consisting of those who remain alive and in the
panel until 2000 enables to test for non-random attrition (cf. Nijman and Verbeek,
1996). Since under the null of ignorable attrition the estimates from the unbalanced
sample are e±cient and those from the balanced panel are consistent, while both would
be inconsistent under the alternative, a generalized Hausman test can be performed.
Since we are particularly interested in the causal e®ect of wealth in this equation, we
performed the Hausman test on the lagged wealth coe±cient only. We ¯nd that the two
estimates for males are similar (-0.003 (balanced) vs -0.005 (unbalanced)) and marginally
reject the null (Chi-sq.[1] = 4.26, p-value = 0.039). Similarly for wives the coe±cients
are -0.0046 (balanced) and -0.0056 (unbalanced) and there is no evidence for selective
attrition (Chi-sq.[1] = 0.72, p-value = 0.395).
These tests thus all suggest that attrition is mostly ignorable for the parameters
of interest { the causal e®ects from wealth to health. In what follows, we will report
estimates from the unbalanced samples. The results using the balanced samples are
always qualitatively similar.
Adams et al. (2003) pay a lot of attention to testing whether causal e®ects are
invariant over time, although Poterba (2003) casts some doubt on the importance of this
issue. We tested whether the relationship between health and wealth was stable over
time. For husbands, the coe±cients on lagged wealth (in a test for non-causality to the
CHI) varies from -0.0124 to 0.0014 in 2002. Some evidence is provided that the e®ects are
not the same (Chi-square(4) = 12.83, p-value = 0.012) while the equality is not rejected
for wives (Chi-square(4) = 4.18, p-value = 0.382). In fact, the parameters on lagged
wealth for husbands appear to be decreasing over time, which could be a combined e®ect
of attrition and invariance if di®erential mortality considerably reduces the variance of
health and wealth outcomes (see Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) for evidence on di®erential
mortality).
175 Causality Tests in Dynamic Panel Data models
To estimate the reduced form and structural VARs we use the generalized method of
moments with robust two-step estimates (see for example Arellano and Bond, 1991).
In order to incorporate mean stationarity restrictions, we use the combination of level
and di®erence moments of Blundell and Bond (1998) discussed in Section 3.2. These
additional moments in levels were not rejected by incremental Sargan tests. We include
time dummies to pick-up unobserved trends in the components determining the gradient
and, where necessary as indicated by speci¯cation tests rejecting invariance, interactions
with time dummies to account for changing relationships over time. E±ciency gains
can be realized by estimating all equations of the VAR system together if the optimal
weighting matrix is not diagonal (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999). However, the
¯nite-sample properties of the estimator may deteriorate. We therefore estimate them
separately. We experimented with several lag structures and found that models with two
lags were needed to pass the usual speci¯cation tests (the Sargan test on overidentifying
restrictions and the test on second order autocorrelation in the di®erenced residual; see
Arellano and Bond, 1991). The results for the selected models are presented in Tables 10,
11 and 12. In each case, we present a reduced form equation without instantaneous e®ects
of wealth on health or vice versa, and a structural form equation in which the instruments
in section 3.2 are used to identify instantaneous e®ects of endogenous variables.
5.1 Health to Wealth
Table 10 presents the results for equations explaining log household wealth. For these
selected models, overidentifying restrictions are marginally rejected at the 5% level but
not at the 4% level. There is no evidence of second order serial correlation in the
di®erenced errors (supporting that the errors in levels are uncorrelated over time).
The reduced form estimates imply a signi¯cant negative e®ect of both lagged hus-
band's health and lagged wife's health on log wealth. Joint tests indicate that lagged
values of husband's health signi¯cantly a®ect log wealth, rejecting the hypothesis that
husband's health causes does not cause wealth. This is the same conclusion as from the
Adams et al. (2003) tests in the previous section, but now unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled for and the lag structure is richer, chosen on the basis of speci¯cation tests.
The wife's health also a®ects log wealth but this e®ect is signi¯cant only at the 3% level.
The structural estimates con¯rm the evidence of health causation. There is no evi-
dence for an immediate e®ect of husband's health, and the e®ects of the lagged husband
health variables are similar to those in the reduced form equation. The joint signi¯cance
remains, con¯rming the conclusion that husband's health causes wealth. Current and
lagged variables on the wife's health are jointly signi¯cant at any reasonable signi¯cance
level. The immediate negative e®ect dominates, and the conclusion that health problems
of the wife cause negative wealth changes is stronger than in the reduced form. Thus,
overall, we can conclude that the results of the Adams et al. tests on health wealth
causation were not just a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity - strong evidence
18remains in a model that controls for this. Moreover, the results of the structural model
suggest di®erences in the time lags with which husband's and wife's health changes a®ect
household wealth, with an instantaneous e®ect for the wife's health and a lagged e®ect
for husbands. This may also explain the di®erence with Wu (2003), who uses only two
waves of the HRS and ¯nds that the wealth of households tends to respond more to
health events of the wife than to health events of the husband. A longer time span is
needed to ¯nd the e®ect of the husband's health.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
5.2 Wealth to Health
The results for the equation explaining the husband's health are presented in Table
11. Adding the second order lags and the interaction of lagged health with time was
necessary to obtain a model that passes the Sargan test on overidentifying restrictions
and the test autocorrelation in the errors. The results provide no evidence whatsoever
on wealth health causation for husbands. Both in the reduced form and in the structural
equation, the wealth variables are jointly (and individually) insigni¯cant. This result
di®ers from what we found with the Adams et al. (2003) tests in the previous section.
The plausible explanation is that rejecting non-causality there was due to the presence
of permanent unobserved heterogeneity a®ecting health and household wealth. These
terms are controlled for in Table 11.
Another di®erence with Table 7 is that we now ¯nd no evidence of a causal e®ect of
the wife's health on the husband's health. In both the reduced form and the structural
form equation, the wife's health variables are insigni¯cant. Unobserved factors that
a®ect husband's and wife's health in the same way are the most plausible explanation
for the di®erence in ¯ndings.
Table 12 presents the results for the equations explaining the wife's health. The
results are essentially the same as for the husband's health. Other than in the previous
section, the models controlling for ¯xed e®ects do not provide any evidence of causal
e®ects from wealth on the wife's health or from the husband's health on the wife's health.
5.3 Some Disaggregated Results
We have found clear evidence of causal e®ects of both the husband's and the wife's health
on household wealth, using the constructed health index which incorporates all features
of health. Table 13 shows the results of a similar dynamic panel data model using
separate indicators for physical and mental health. The physical health index combines
onsets of physical disorders (all onsets except depression) and ADL-s, the mental health
index combines the CESD score with the onset of depression. Self-reported general and
work-related health and the self-reported probability of dying before age 75 are not
included since they capture both mental and physical health features.
19The results in Table 13 show evidence of causal household wealth e®ects of physical
health for the husband and mental health for the wife. Mental health is not signi¯cant
for the husband and physical health is insigni¯cant for wives. A mental health problem
of the wife has an instantaneous e®ect on household wealth, while the e®ect of the
husband's physical health is not instantaneous, in line with what we found earlier.
Further disaggregation is possible by partitioning wealth into liquid and non-liquid
wealth, as in Table 3. This shows that for non-liquid wealth, both physical and mental
health of both husband and wife are signi¯cant, albeit the signi¯cance probabilities for
the wife are close to 5%. Only mental health of the wife has a signi¯cant instantaneous
e®ect, the other causal mechanisms work with lags of two years. For liquid wealth,
causal e®ects are found for mental health of both spouses but not for physical health.
Again, the e®ect of mental health of the wife is instantaneous, that of the husband is
not. Detailed results are available upon request.
One explanation for the strong e®ects of mental health might be the lack of insurance
coverage for mental health problems. Indeed these are covered in a limited way by
Medicare and Medicaid and therefore employer-provided insurance coverage or other
insurance coverage is necessary to protect against those onsets (Adams et al., 2003).
Disaggregating by health insurance coverage status does lead to a clear picture. Indeed
those wives who do not have employer-provided health insurance tend to be those for
which a health shock has a large immediate e®ect on wealth. Furthermore, the stronger
e®ect of the wife's mental health status than of the husband's is in line with Wu's (2003)
argument that household expenditures increase if the wife is no longer able to perform
household tasks such as cooking and cleaning. The stronger e®ect of the husband's
physical health might relate to his role as breadwinner. A model that simultaneously
considers labor force participation and earnings would be needed to investigate this
further.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we compare two ways of testing for causal pathways between health
and socioeconomic status using panel data on an elderly US cohort. One follows the
methodology of Adams et al. (2003) based upon Granger causality. The second is an
extension of this using a dynamic panel data framework. The main di®erence is that this
allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, avoiding the problem that rejecting
non-causality might be due to ignoring unobserved heterogeneity terms. We use biennial
¯ve waves of elderly couples in the HRS, following the 1931-1941 birth cohort over the
time period 1992-2000.
While the Adams et al. (2003) suggest causal e®ects in both directions, from health
to wealth and from wealth to health, our dynamic panel data model based tests also
provide clear evidence of causal e®ects from health to wealth, but hardly any evidence
of causal e®ects from wealth to either the husband's or the wife's health. An analysis
of the residuals suggests that this di®erence is not due to unobserved heterogeneity in
20health, but to unobserved heterogeneity in wealth or the richer dynamic speci¯cation of
the dynamic panel data model. Disaggregating health into mental and physical health
suggests that both have causal e®ects on wealth, but while the mental health e®ects
are instantaneous, the physical health e®ects take more time and are visible only in
the next wave (two years later). Interestingly insurance coverage appears to play a
role as suggested by the evidence that uninsured wives who experience onsets of mental
conditions tend to spend down household assets more importantly.
We would like to stress that the absence of an active causal link does not mean that
it has not operated in the past. Here, we only consider households with at least one
spouse in their ¯fties. It would be interesting to apply the same approach to younger
households. It would also be interesting to look at di®erent countries, and see whether
the institutional setting makes a di®erence.
The ¯nding that health - wealth causation (health selection, in the social science
literature) is the main driving force for the development of the gradient in this age
group con¯rms evidence of Smith (1999,2003), Adda (2003), Hurd and Kapteyn (2003)
and Wu (2003). Particularly for husbands, the long-run e®ect of a health shock is
considerable. This raises an interesting welfare and policy question: Is this drop in
wealth planned or is it the consequence of inadequate health insurance? Smith (2003)
¯nds that out-of-pocket medical expenditures can be considerable in the HRS cohort.
Therefore, even for individuals with health insurance, there remains considerable risk to
insure.
Further research could also incorporate the role of labor force participation and
earnings. Other than the AHEAD cohort studied by Adams et al. (2003), the HRS
cohort that we consider is typically at work in the ¯rst wave that we observe them and
has retired before the last wave. One of the potential channels of health- wealth causality
is through labor supply and earnings, making it worthwhile to extend the model with
labor supply (and the decision to retire) and earnings.
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24Sample Couples Exit rate (%)
1992 4160
Exit 1993-1994 419 10.07
1994 3741
Exit 1995-1996 355 9.48
1996 3386
Exit 1997-1998 335 9.89
1998 3051
Exit 1999-2000 278 9.11
2000 2773
Exit 2001-2002 310 11.18
2002 2463
Table 1: Sample Composition : Obser-
vations per wave along with exits that oc-
cur in between this wave and the follow-
ing wave are reported. The percentage of
those present in a wave exiting prior to
the next interview is also reported in the
second column.
25Demographics 1992 No-Exit Ex 1993 Ex 1995 Ex 1997 Ex 1999 Ex 2001
Husband
Age (years) 56.70 56.96 57.67 58.06 58.71 57.80
Years of schooling 12.44 11.75 11.36 11.91 11.77 11.74
Dummy Hispanic 0.071 0.093 0.079 0.071 0.075 0.096
Dummy Black 0.097 0.186 0.146 0.164 0.111 0.106
Dummy Not born in U.S. 0.089 0.093 0.104 0.101 0.089 0.087
Dummy Not ¯rst marriage 0.279 0.372 0.313 0.319 0.291 0.316
Wife
Age (years) 52.84 52.90 53.40 54.30 53.91 53.76
Years of schooling 12.39 12.03 11.73 12.08 11.86 11.74
Dummy Hispanic 0.073 0.105 0.079 0.080 0.064 0.119
Dummy Black 0.095 0.169 0.149 0.167 0.111 0.103
Dummy Not born in U.S 0.099 0.107 0.101 0.119 0.061 0.112
Dummy Not ¯rst marriage (%) 0.243 0.353 0.256 0.281 0.273 0.312
Number of couples 2463 419 355 335 278 310
Total number of observations 14778 419 710 1005 1112 1550
Table 2: Demographic Characteristics: Characteristics in 1992 by period of exit
from the panel.
26median (participation %>0) % imputed 1992 2002
Liquid wealth 38.81 (74.1) 80.0 (47.8)
IRAs 21.6 31.57 (45.1) 68.24 (47.2)
Stocks 11.2 25.24 (32.1) 50.0 (37.4)
Bonds 3.4 12.62 (6.9) 35.0 (8.6)
Checking/savings account 18.8 6.56 (86.2) 10.0 (89.1)
Cert./T.bills/Sav.Bds 7.3 10.10 (29.5) 20.0 (26.9)
Debt (substracted) 3.78 (41.0) 5.0 (28.2)
Non-liquid wealth 103.51 (97.2) 136.0 (99.0)
Primary residence 4.3 100.98 (87.9) 130.0 (92.3)
Mortgage (subtracted) 3.5 37.87 (50.6) 56.0 (35.5)
Other real estates 5.1 56.80 (27.4) 70.0 (21.3)
Business assets 4.6 88.36 (15.2) 150.0 (13.4)
Trans./vehicules assets 10.2 12.62 (95.9) 15.0 (95.7)
Total wealth (bus. excluded) 142.64 (95.5) 211.0 (99.0)
Number of households 4150 2468
Table 3: Composition of Household Wealth. All wealth ¯g-
ures are in thousands USD 2002 using the BLS CPI index. The
percentage imputed is reported. Ownership (participation) is in
brackets. Other debts or loans are not shown in the table but en-
ter negatively the calculation of liquid wealth. Business assets are
not included when computing non-liquid and total wealth. Note
that the highest 1a®ect the calculation of the median
.
27Health Indicators Husbands Wives
mean/fraction reported 1992 2002 1992 2002
Self-Reported Health 2.577 2.754 2.420 2.594
Severe Condition (ever had) 0.238 0.449 0.167 0.317
Cancer 0.039 0.132 0.059 0.119
Heart condition 0.148 0.286 0.072 0.153
Lung Disease 0.062 0.091 0.049 0.087
Stroke 0.038 0.075 0.017 0.045
Mild Condition (ever had) 0.565 0.813 0.554 0.799
Diabetes 0.101 0.208 0.076 0.138
High blood pressure 0.359 0.538 0.285 0.492
Arthritis 0.299 0.562 0.358 0.632
Emotional/psyc. problems 0.044 0.089 0.082 0.184
ADLs (>0) 0.045 0.105 0.034 0.102
CESD score 0.585 0.939 0.706 1.290
Body-Mass Index 27.31 27.98 26.76 27.82
P(death before 75) 0.365 0.326 0.334 0.329
Health limits work 0.213 0.263 0.179 0.239
Number of respondents 4160 2463 4160 2463
Table 4: Health of Husbands and Wives. Cells report
mean or pct of each health variable. The ¯rst column
for each spouse (1992 all) refers to the whole sample in
1992 while the second column reports the same statis-
tics for respondents in 2002. ADLs refer to limitations
in performing activities of daily life while CESD scores
are on a scale of 0 to 8 and record a±rmative questions
to a set of questions on mental health (10 bads and 2
goods which are substracted).
28Health 1992 Wife (from good to bad health)
Husband 1st qtile 2nd qtile 3rd qtile 4th qtile Total
1st qtile 392 296 205 163 1056
(0.09,0.36) (0.06,0.25) (0.06,0.25) (0.03,0.13)
2nd qtile 290 295 236 207 1028
(0.07,0.29) (0.07,0.28) (0.06,0.24) (0.05,0.20)
3rd qtile 222 268 255 291 1036
(0.05,0.21) (0.06,0.26) (0.06,0.24) (0.07,0.30)
4th qtile 140 234 294 372 1040
(0.04,0.14) (0.05,0.21) (0.07,0.27) (0.10,0.38)
Total 1044 1093 990 1033 4160
Chi-square = 254.77 (df=15)
Table 5: Distribution of Household Health Indices in 1992. 1st row
for each quartile report actual frequencies with underneath the cell
relative frequency and the conditional relative frequency within each
quartiles. The constructed health indices of both spouses in 1992 are
used. Individuals in high quartiles are in worse health compared to
those in the lower quartiles. The chi-square test of independence has
15 degrees of freedom.
29Median wealth
Husband Health Index 1992 2002
best quartile 176.7 285.4
2nd quartile 151.2 225.4
%¢ w.r.t. 1st -14.4% -21.0%
3rd quartile 127.5 185.6
%¢ w.r.t. 1st -27.8% -35.0%
worst quartile 86.3 113.5
%¢ w.r.t. 1st -51.2% -60.2%
Wife Health Index 1992 2002
best quartile 203.9 326.3
2nd quartile 162.6 248.0
%¢ w.r.t. 1st -20.3% -24.0%
3rd quartile 111.8 176.3
%¢ w.r.t. 1st -45.2% -46.0%
worst quartile 83.3 108.5
%¢ w.r.t. 1st -59.1% -66.7%
Table 6: The Wealth-Health Gradient .
Cells give median wealth in thousands
2002 USD, while the second row gives
the percentage di®erence with respect
to the 1st quartile of the health distribu-
tion of the spouse in 1992. Total house-
hold wealth and constructed health in-
dices (CHI) are used
30Husbands (over all waves)
Covariates Health Index Severe Onsets Mild Onsets Self-Report
yt¡1 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008
(-3.33) (-1.54) (-2.57) (-2.59)
hm
t¡1 0.867 0.068 -0.019 0.893
(129.9) (4.08) (-1.31) (52.16)
h
f
t¡1 0.021 0.023 0.018 0.035
(3.85) (1.31) (1.27) (2.61)
Invariance 12.83** Attrition 4.26**
Covariates CESD score ADLs Hazard 75 Hlth limits work
yt¡1 -0.014 -0.011 0.196 -0.010
(-4.78) (-2.64) (2.39) (-2.66)
hm
t¡1 0.476 0.578 12.845 0.789
(32.82) (30.86) (32.68) (36.97)
h
f
t¡1 0.058 0.052 -0.114 -0.006
(3.84) (2.65) (-0.29) (-0.35)
Table 7: Non-Causality: Wealth to Husband Health: Point estimates
of lagged health and wealth are reported with t-values in parenthesis.
Models for the health index, self-reported hazard are estimated by OLS,
for Self-reported health, CESD scores and ADL count, ordered probits
and for the remaining variables, probits where errors are clustered at
the couple level. Controls are included for demographics and lagged risk
factors as well as dummy variables. The complete results are available
upon requests
.
31Wives (over all waves)
Covariates Health Index Severe Onsets Mild Onsets Self-Report
yt¡1 -0.006 -0.012 -0.006 -0.006
(-3.52) (-3.03) (-2.04) (-1.80)
hm
t¡1 0.026 0.017 0.021 0.049
(4.74) (0.88) (1.47) (3.67)
h
f
t¡1 0.860 0.166 -0.037 0.917
(129.69) (9.81) (2.46) (49.4)
Invariance 4.18 Attrition 0.72
Covariates CESD score ADLs Hazard 75 Hlth limits work
yt¡1 -0.005 -0.004 -0.040 -0.007
(-2.00) (-1.12) (-0.47) (-1.55)
hm
t¡1 0.067 0.021 0.944 0.041
(4.93) (1.02) (2.48) (2.15)
h
f
t¡1 0.480 0.659 11.71 0.765
(34.34) (35.07) (26.73) (34.63)
Table 8: Non-Causality: Wealth to Wife Health: Point estimates
of lagged health and wealth are reported with t-values in parenthesis.
Models for the health index, self-reported hazard are estimated by OLS,
for Self-reported health, CESD scores and ADL count, ordered probits
and for the remaining variables, probits where errors are clustered at
the couple level. Controls are included for demographics and lagged risk
factors as well as dummy variables. The complete results are available
upon requests
.
32log total wealth hyper. total wealth
Covariates levels robust levels









t¡1 -0.258 -0.024 -0.007
(-6.56) (-4.39) (-8.24)
Table 9: Non-Causality: Health to Wealth: Point estimates
and t-values are reported for regressions in levels (errors clus-
tered at household level), robust regressions applying Huber
weights and within (¯xed-e®ects) regressions.The same set of
controls as for the wealth non-causation tests are included.
The complete results are available upon requests for total,
non-liquid and liquid wealth.
.
33Unrestricted Structural
Covariates Pe T-stat Pe T-stat
yt¡1 0.157 2.86 0.154 2.86
yt¡2 0.034 1.48 0.029 1.29
yt¡1£t -0.017 -1.00 -0.016 -0.94
hm
t - -0.163 -1.05
hm
t¡1 -0.636 -4.35 -0.517 -3.05
hm
t¡2 -0.275 -3.38 -0.236 -2.62
hm
t¡1£t 0.081 2.60 0.081 2.63
h
f
t - -0.499 -2.54
h
f
t¡1 -0.388 -2.63 -0.129 -0.70
h
f
t¡2 0.007 0.01 0.108 1.31
h
f
t¡1£t 0.025 0.76 0.034 1.01
Â2 p-val Â2 p-val
Sargan test 45.61 0.04 46.71 0.04


































Table 10: Dynamic Model for Health Causa-
tion: Two-step point estimates and t-values
are reported. All estimation is done by system
GMM making use of moments in levels.
.
34Unrestricted Structural
Covariates Pe t-stat Pe t-stat
hm
t¡1 0.596 12.91 0.602 12.56
hm
t¡2 0.279 12.29 0.282 12.25
hm
t¡3 0.106 4.74 0.106 4.73
hm






t¡1 0.037 1.03 0.018 0.41
h
f
t¡2 -0.002 -0.06 -0.012 -0.51
h
f
t¡1£t -0.006 -0.81 -0.008 -0.97
yt 0.007 0.28
yt¡1 -0.002 -0.22 -0.002 -0.20
yt¡2 -0.003 -0.76 -0.004 -0.89
yt¡1£t -0.001 -0.17 -0.001 -0.24
Â2 p-val Â2 p-val


















t¡2 . . 0.52 0.71
yt;yt¡1;t £ yt¡1;yt¡2 . . 0.26 0.90
N 3051 3051
Table 11: Dynamic Model for Wealth Causa-
tion on Husband Health: Two-step point es-
timates and t-values are reported. All estima-




Covariates Pe t-stat Pe t-stat
h
f
t¡1 0.546 34.82 0.541 12.13
h
f
t¡2 0.266 12.55 0.265 12.41
h
f
t¡3 0.081 3.66 0.082 3.56
h
f
t¡1£t 0.009 0.97 0.009 0.89
hm
t . . 0.024 0.58
hm
t¡1 0.060 1.54 0.026 0.51
hm
t¡2 0.002 0.12 -0.015 -0.67
hm
t¡1£t -0.011 -1.29 -0.009 -1.06
yt . . -0.034 -1.25
yt¡1 0.008 0.83 0.007 0.59
yt¡2 -0.002 0.47 -0.001 -0.16
yt¡1£t -0.001 -0.48 -0.001 -0.08
Â2 p-val Â2 p-val













t¡2 . . 0.51 0.72
yt;yt¡1;t £ yt¡1;yt¡2 . . 0.98 0.41
N 3051 3051
Table 12: Dynamic Model for Wealth Causa-
tion on Wife Health: Two-step point estimates
and t-values are reported. All estimation is
done by system GMM making use of moments
in levels.
.
36GMM/sys AR2 Estimates Causality test













































t¡1£t 0.001 0.04 1.83 0.139
Table 13: Wealth responses to Mental and Physical Healh: Two-
step point estimates and t-values are reported. All estimation is done
by system GMM making use of moments in levels. The mental health
index is composed of CESD scores and onsets of psychic or mental health
condition while the physical health index includes onsets of severe and
mild conditions as well as ADLs
.
37Appendix 1: Variable names for supplementary results (not intended for
publication)
Any variable starts with either r or s if it is spouse speci¯c. In that case, r refers
to husband and s to wife. Other variables not starting with these letters is for the
household. In the following list of variables, the ¯rst letter is suppressed. A variable to
which a l is added in front (lrhe for example) refers to the ¯rst lag of the variable.
Variable name units
shlt self-reported health [1,5]
sce number severe onset ever [0-.
mce number mild onset ever [0-.]
scs severe onset since [0,1]
mcs mild onset since [0,1]
cesd cesd mental health score [-2,-8]
adla number of Adls [0,.]
haz75 1-subjective prob living 75 [0,100]






im not born U.S. [0,1]
sm ever smoked [0,1]
v doing vigorous activity [0,1]
d ever drink [0,1]
bmi body-mass index [0,1]
d* year dummies [0,1]
zat hyperbolic transform of total wealth [0,1]
lat log transform of total wealth
38Appendix 2: Construction of Health Indices by Principle Component
Analysis: Results (not intended for publication)
The health index are constructed by principle component analysis using 6 covariates:
self-reported health, prevalence of severe and mild health conditions, CESD scores, num-
ber of ADLs and the self-reported hazard of not living up to 75 (taken as 1 minus the
true response to the self-reported probability of living up to 75). This is performed for
each spouse across all waves. From the analysis, one factor is retained and therefore
the rotation does not yield any improvement. The factors who score highest appear to
be in accordance with common belief. Self-reported health and health conditions score
highest. We did experiment with alternative health index with small changes in the
results of the analysis. The index is not scaled and varies between -3 and 5. We did
experiment with taking a log of that index but this did not alter results of the analysis.
Husband Health Index
(principal component factors; 1 factor retained)
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2.27030 1.35532 0.3784 0.3784
2 0.91498 0.02858 0.1525 0.5309
3 0.88640 0.13754 0.1477 0.6786
4 0.74887 0.06496 0.1248 0.8034
5 0.68391 0.18837 0.1140 0.9174
6 0.49554 . 0.0826 1.0000











(principal component factors; 1 factor retained)
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2.40634 1.52656 0.4011 0.4011
2 0.87978 0.04176 0.1466 0.5477
3 0.83802 0.10931 0.1397 0.6874
4 0.72871 0.05096 0.1215 0.8088
5 0.67776 0.20836 0.1130 0.9218
6 0.46939 . 0.0782 1.0000










39Appendix 3: Detailled Non-Causality Tests (not intended for publication)
The cut parameters refer to cuto® points in ordered probit models while cons refers to
the constant term. Parameter estimates reported with t-values below estimates. Severe and
mild refer to the incidence of a new health onset between wave as opposed to prevalence of an
onset.
Non-Causality Husband: Log Trans.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | CHI severe mild self-report
-------------+----------------------------------------------------
llat | -.00529456 -.00632572 -.00859092 -.00859602
| -3.33 -1.54 -2.57 -2.59
lrhe | .86759944 .06761472 -.01979635 .89305861
| 129.88 4.08 -1.31 52.16
lshe | .02087951 .02285174 .01869973 .03536146
| 3.85 1.31 1.27 2.61
ra | .00615108 .02316601 .00095297 .00834189
| 6.31 7.26 0.35 3.22
sa | -.00017361 .00321946 .00069032 -.00238659
| -0.19 1.08 0.28 -0.95
rs | -.00719668 .00947277 -.01179727 -.04019967
| -4.26 1.71 -2.52 -8.73
ss | -.00539452 -.01001907 -.00277609 -.01075194
| -2.59 -1.46 -0.47 -1.89
rblack | -.00499846 -.19840037 .10988164 -.08180984
| -0.10 -1.15 0.71 -0.45
sblack | .02448642 .20565093 -.05377183 .25278675
| 0.48 1.18 -0.34 1.38
rhisp | .02280676 -.25742793 .05311545 .02699748
| 0.69 -2.06 0.64 0.32
shisp | -.0171726 .01041156 .05335301 .10929485
| -0.55 0.09 0.64 1.31
rim | -.00730491 -.12826945 -.09804668 .05606878
| -0.42 -1.76 -1.79 1.06
sim | -.01072048 .06682293 .01247943 -.05183467
| -0.65 1.01 0.23 -0.97
lssm | .00741237 .05885144 -.02097394 -.03171348
| 0.92 2.01 -0.84 -1.36
lrsm | .04109296 .10257187 .06761475 .0527903
| 4.88 3.06 2.40 1.99
lsv | -.01176468 -.03931422 -.01649506 -.02791343
| -1.25 -1.18 -0.59 -1.33
lrv | -.03295476 -.04663254 -.02885205 -.15754161
| -3.58 -1.41 -0.99 -7.26
lsd | .00704345 -.02844136 .02613288 -.01143918
| 0.72 -0.83 0.91 -0.48
lrd | -.01748661 -.02996761 -.0115648 -.03622906
| -1.75 -0.87 -0.39 -1.48
lsbmi | .00032789 .00008379 -.00021156 .00703851
| 0.42 0.03 -0.09 3.22
lrbmi | .00579511 .00469232 .02075205 .00457664
| 5.21 1.36 7.28 1.78
d1996 | -.06110124 -.02836746 .03646326 -.12311079
| -4.07 -0.60 0.90 -4.91
d1998 | .05326643 .03530462 .08975402 .15306858
| 3.73 0.69 2.04 5.57
d2000 | -.08787253 .03166698 .1131303 -.14663341
| -5.89 0.60 2.48 -4.78
d2002 | -.01985691 .1155118 .20358741 -.11195025









_cons | -.18108582 -3.1619629 -1.6350344
| -2.44 -12.88 -8.10
------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
40Non-Causality for Husband Health: Log Transformation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | cesd adls haz75 hlthlm
-------------+----------------------------------------------------
llat | -.01411789 -.01110779 .19653436 -.01046539
| -4.78 -2.64 2.39 -2.66
lrhe | .47616274 .57879914 12.845796 .78954518
| 32.82 30.86 32.68 36.97
lshe | .05887024 .05188096 -.11405847 -.0067652
| 3.84 2.65 -0.29 -0.35
ra | -.00502549 .02149201 -1.1713469 .02588458
| -1.62 4.67 -15.22 6.42
sa | -.00635338 -.00422365 .20973457 -.00907628
| -2.30 -1.04 3.04 -2.32
rs | -.02889303 -.00130348 -.28522715 -.01635464
| -5.29 -0.18 -2.02 -2.28
ss | -.00210089 -.01259714 -.2975154 -.00012505
| -0.32 -1.41 -1.79 -0.01
rblack | .20913447 .07641707 -5.3733603 .03501252
| 1.25 0.32 -1.41 0.16
sblack | -.02544235 -.13456561 1.7956441 -.13193746
| -0.15 -0.57 0.47 -0.59
rhisp | .21658692 .10038378 -.50479616 -.10206521
| 2.29 0.79 -0.20 -0.83
shisp | -.01492327 -.03029483 -1.8849198 -.04238864
| -0.16 -0.24 -0.72 -0.34
rim | .05311272 .13070532 -1.676032 -.01216837
| 0.86 1.33 -1.15 -0.14
sim | .10462687 -.10345414 -1.116215 -.17497842
| 1.73 -1.07 -0.74 -2.03
lssm | .01140446 .01982734 -.26377224 .0678535
| 0.39 0.48 -0.37 1.83
lrsm | .00396158 .02958399 .98280392 .01768761
| 0.12 0.63 1.28 0.42
lsv | -.02758544 .0435031 -.5887904 -.00901767
| -1.17 1.19 -1.13 -0.29
lrv | .02289362 -.22948354 -.36218964 -.20340594
| 0.94 -5.79 -0.68 -6.53
lsd | -.00887449 .01940634 -1.0061419 .01642947
| -0.32 0.47 -1.52 0.45
lrd | .03109806 -.03048607 1.2544986 -.11207598
| 1.13 -0.77 1.85 -3.16
lsbmi | -.00332562 -.00014667 -.05451703 .00302345
| -1.36 -0.04 -0.84 0.94
lrbmi | .00083187 .01567821 -.2359597 .00216115
| 0.25 3.58 -2.92 0.53
d1996 | -.0354908 .16357824 -1.4181812 -.07453063
| -1.41 3.44 -3.10 -2.39
d1998 | .14849855 .18970022 -.07152102 -.04683315
| 5.10 3.79 -0.12 -1.22
d2000 | .02640818 .06603148 -1.6247011 -.24435029
| 0.81 1.17 -2.43 -5.49
d2002 | -.01734663 .03100817 -.40513019 -.24145411
| -0.45 0.50 -0.51 -4.71
_cut1 | -1.0348304 2.8111354
| -4.34 8.43
_cut2 | -.31373372 3.3779846
| -1.32 10.07
_cut3 | .0904008 3.7666561
| 0.38 11.23
_cut4 | .38341163 4.1291089
| 1.61 12.33












41Non-Causality for Wife Health: Log Transformation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | CHI severe mild self-report
-------------+----------------------------------------------------
llat | -.00560297 -.01242151 -.00677761 -.00570686
| -3.52 -3.03 -2.04 -1.80
lrhe | .0263291 .01701927 .02144944 .04910688
| 4.74 0.88 1.47 3.67
lshe | .86045338 .16650383 -.036814 .91766015
| 129.69 9.81 -2.46 49.40
ra | -.00017014 .00767657 .00124698 -.00025713
| -0.18 2.06 0.46 -0.09
sa | .00283165 .0116609 .00278271 .00484721
| 3.40 3.27 1.11 2.01
rs | -.00212511 .00449964 -.00320721 -.02134899
| -1.29 0.68 -0.68 -4.67
ss | -.01309202 -.01077683 -.0165174 -.0336061
| -6.50 -1.31 -2.95 -5.96
rblack | -.031996 -.17253326 -.0486421 -.23637388
| -0.54 -0.85 -0.32 -2.02
sblack | .0504983 .09537367 .05915738 .39037157
| 0.84 0.47 0.40 3.29
rhisp | -.00467785 -.11175797 -.09758449 -.12032384
| -0.19 -0.88 -1.22 -1.44
shisp | .00488581 .07847678 .10257375 .25186962
| 0.19 0.63 1.34 3.08
rim | .02588382 -.1547551 .18296268 .1406931
| 1.48 -1.70 3.25 2.49
sim | -.00110022 -.20961138 -.10852411 .04150137
| -0.06 -2.40 -1.90 0.76
lssm | .04459073 .1347654 .0760251 .06605162
| 5.68 3.86 3.04 2.70
lrsm | -.01019648 .01743617 -.05757885 .0013113
| -1.18 0.43 -2.06 0.05
lsv | -.03008908 -.06789723 -.04100045 -.15107733
| -3.36 -1.73 -1.44 -7.04
lrv | -.00893315 -.01951661 .02424552 -.02767949
| -0.97 -0.49 0.85 -1.28
lsd | -.03375294 -.03504532 .00246998 -.13502375
| -3.55 -0.87 0.09 -5.56
lrd | -.01117453 -.03693331 .02050149 -.00046454
| -1.12 -0.94 0.72 -0.02
lsbmi | .007034 .001143 .01404799 .00937247
| 8.18 0.35 6.14 4.11
lrbmi | -.00055343 -.00194707 .00424008 .00338491
| -0.56 -0.48 1.47 1.26
d1996 | -.11395908 -.03061615 -.0676772 -.19850945
| -8.13 -0.56 -1.69 -8.27
d1998 | .00373567 -.00859944 -.02122103 .06868632
| 0.27 -0.14 -0.48 2.50
d2000 | -.10233497 .05673682 .04867396 -.21848685
| -6.87 0.91 1.07 -7.07
d2002 | -.07457836 .00730507 .12490945 -.22313617









_cons | .11120091 -2.5814479 -1.5753453
| 1.61 -8.88 -7.55
------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
42Non-Causality for Wife Health: Log Transformation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | cesd adls haz75 hlthlm
-------------+----------------------------------------------------
llat | -.00566801 -.00454561 -.04020642 -.00700203
| -2.00 -1.12 -0.47 -1.55
lrhe | .06786688 .02081881 .94377251 .04079045
| 4.93 1.02 2.48 2.15
lshe | .48021766 .65851048 11.71103 .76525683
| 34.34 35.07 26.73 34.63
ra | -.00202547 -.00496552 .20060222 .00071109
| -0.73 -1.15 2.60 0.17
sa | -.00847232 .00277492 -.43584622 .00923718
| -3.22 0.71 -6.19 2.36
rs | .00709765 -.00910382 -.2127694 -.00258387
| 1.43 -1.33 -1.58 -0.36
ss | -.03830758 -.00650079 -.72145397 -.01263607
| -6.25 -0.71 -4.41 -1.39
rblack | -.12240073 -.00227752 -11.265886 -1.0912077
| -0.82 -0.01 -2.79 -4.56
sblack | .20906927 .19018843 6.1402804 .88017377
| 1.39 0.91 1.51 3.72
rhisp | .15744749 .01081871 3.8554908 -.33579896
| 1.84 0.08 1.69 -2.45
shisp | -.05054377 .02516068 1.4931036 .02057012
| -0.59 0.18 0.65 0.15
rim | .12012205 -.01191818 .83191002 .12161943
| 2.25 -0.13 0.53 1.34
sim | .13846519 .05193701 -1.0458755 -.29582368
| 2.68 0.57 -0.68 -3.14
lssm | .06322003 -.00851868 -.25335553 .15426106
| 2.41 -0.20 -0.37 3.94
lrsm | -.02825364 -.00910379 -.98751066 .03964829
| -0.95 -0.20 -1.28 0.87
lsv | -.00650226 -.15731024 -.64759048 -.16398983
| -0.29 -3.96 -1.23 -5.03
lrv | -.01756 -.04956777 .12681787 .02554653
| -0.79 -1.25 0.24 0.78
lsd | .04112302 -.09712241 -1.1365935 -.09373251
| 1.52 -2.25 -1.76 -2.46
lrd | -.0163148 -.01369354 .74431263 -.00774871
| -0.62 -0.33 1.12 -0.21
lsbmi | -.00096993 .01249382 -.12772092 .01624652
| -0.42 3.54 -1.85 4.67
lrbmi | .0015214 .00418293 .08275956 -.00495552
| 0.50 0.92 1.12 -1.11
d1996 | -.1050489 .13959091 -3.4977335 -.07450783
| -4.12 2.91 -6.95 -2.43
d1998 | .13100903 .1720918 -3.8701534 -.09977707
| 4.55 3.17 -6.39 -2.54
d2000 | .03468579 .1099116 -5.4305672 -.19008883
| 1.08 1.88 -7.74 -4.17
d2002 | -.05581819 .05708043 -5.0312701 -.24062262
| -1.55 0.90 -6.24 -4.73
_cut1 | -.98339787 1.7046627
| -4.64 4.86
_cut2 | -.37782443 2.3051306
| -1.78 6.57
_cut3 | -.03118305 2.7785269
| -0.15 7.93
_cut4 | .2079759 3.2763434
| 0.98 9.23












43Appendix 4: Robustness of Non-causality tests to the Wealth
Transformation used: logs or hyperbolic
We reported results from the log (Table 7) transformation of wealth. The log transforma-
tion of y is taken as logy = I(y ¸ 0)log(1 + y) ¡ I(y < 0)log(1 ¡ y) so that zeros are given
a value of logy equal to zero. There are no observations with wealth lower than one dollar so
that this transformation is a monotone transformation. For negative wealth values, we apply
a symmetric counterpart.
For robustness checks, we also apply the transformation used by Adams et al. (2003). The
hyperbolc transformation is given by z = 1
1+exp(¡cy+d)where c and d are chosen such that z
has median and interquartile range of 0.5 in 1992. This corresponds to choosing c to be the
reciprocal of the interquartile range and d being the ratio of the median to the interquartile
range for the distribution of wealth in 1992. This gives a distribution bounded between 0 and
1 which has a mode around 0.5 but also near 1 where the observations from the right tail of the
wealth distribution will be clustered. The following tables report the non-causality tests from
wealth to health for this transformation where lzat is the log of the hyperbolic transformation
of total wealth.
}
Non-Causality Tests Husbands: Hyperbolic Transformation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | CHI severe mild self-report
-------------+----------------------------------------------------
lzat | -.12603035 -.18240119 -.11675087 -.36383726
| -5.41 -2.00 -1.52 -5.48
lrhe | .8674051 .066809 -.01810357 .8902836
| 130.14 4.04 -1.20 51.74
lshe | .02054976 .02201056 .02048347 .03100634
| 3.79 1.26 1.40 2.29
------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
Non-Causality Tests Husbands: Hyperbolic Transformation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | cesd adls haz75 htlhlm
-------------+----------------------------------------------------
lzat | -.26684348 -.30493884 -.53282459 -.21104535
| -3.22 -2.35 -0.29 -1.97
lrhe | .47694814 .57821368 12.756382 .78908657
| 33.00 30.99 32.43 36.96
lshe | .06046526 .05218081 -.22231765 -.00600238
| 3.94 2.69 -0.56 -0.31
------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
Non-Causality Tests Wives: Hyperbolic Transformation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | CHI severe mild self-report
-------------+----------------------------------------------------
lzat | -.1235723 -.34300537 -.15794606 -.27025901
| -5.55 -3.19 -2.04 -4.03
lrhe | .02630515 .01635914 .02147839 .04614534
| 4.70 0.85 1.47 3.43
lshe | .86033102 .16635992 -.03684771 .91389546
| 128.38 9.80 -2.45 49.24
------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
Non-Causality Tests Wives: Hyperbolic Transformation
------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | cesd adls haz75 hlthlm
-------------+----------------------------------------------------
lzat | -.20606923 -.13142444 -4.5340086 -.0455914
| -2.81 -1.02 -2.52 -0.39
lrhe | .06649566 .02102026 .8759697 .04304097
| 4.84 1.03 2.29 2.27
lshe | .47839845 .65847596 11.625813 .76718187
44| 34.24 34.75 26.54 34.53
------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
45Appendix 5: Invariance and Attrition Tests Results (not intended for
publication)
We replicate the non-causality test for each wave separately. Therefore we do not
restrict any parameter to remain stable across waves. Point estimates along with their
t-values reported. We get the joint distribution of parameters across all waves by esti-
mating all parameters using semingly unrelated regressions. The wald test reported is
for the equality of the lagged log wealth parameter.
Invariance of Non-Causality from wealth to health for husbands (health index, logs used for wealth)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
llat | -.01242167 -.00400879 .00203595 -.00573506 ..00148368
| -5.33 -1.42 0.74 -1.62 0.39
lrhe | .91247126 .84507334 .86013565 .85518786 ..87264058
| 78.60 71.47 72.87 69.86 68.26
lshe | .00755225 .04841508 .01442193 .01506073 ..02924113
| 0.61 3.88 1.27 1.25 2.31
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
Wald Test: all lagged wealth parameters equal
chi2( 4) = 12.83
Prob > chi2 = 0.0122
Invariance of Non-Causality from wealth to health for wives (health index, logs used for wealth)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
llat | -.00742202 -.00827569 -.00119705 -.00628881 -.00014154
| -3.39 -2.99 -0.45 -1.76 -0.04
lrhe | .06360013 -.00070861 .04297041 .01338514 ..01525666
| 5.83 -0.06 3.73 1.09 1.22
lshe | .86404352 .89370575 .84465968 .83854827 ..87192672
| 73.80 73.01 76.17 69.16 70.41
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
Wald Test: all lagged wealth parameters are equal
chi2( 4) = 4.18
Prob > chi2 = 0.3819
We test for an attrition bias by noting as Nijman and Verbeek (1996) did that if
there is no attrition bias, both unbalanced and balanced sample estimates wille be
consistent while the unbalanced panel estimates should be more e±cient. Otherwise,
under the alternative both estimators with not be consistent. Therefore this suggest
a Hausman speci¯cation test of the form (bb ¡ bu)0(V ar(bb ¡ bu))¡1(bb ¡ bu) which will
be asymptotically chi-square distributed. We perform this test for the lagged wealth
coe±cient which is our object of interest in this paper. We estimated V ar(bb ¡ bu) by
semingly unrelated regressions which enables to relax the assumption of e±ciency under
the null of no random attrition.The results are reported in the following table (along
with p-values in parenthesis) for the two wealth transformations.
log transformation hyperbolic transformation
Husbands 4.26** (0.0391) 2.76 (0.096)
Wives 0.72 (0.3959) 0.003 (0.97)
46Appendix 6: Dynamic Models: Model Selection and Speci¯cation Tests (not
intended for publication)
We report di®erent models for unrestricted VARs of health causation and wealth
causation. No qualitative information for model selection was derived from structural
models. We based model selection on three criterias, parsimony, the Sargan test for
overidentifying restrictions and the ar2 test for errors in di®erences. We also report
the Incremental Sargan test which evaluates the adequacy of the mean stationarity
restrictions.
Unrestricted VARs: Health Causation
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | GMM/sys AR1 GMM/sys AR2 GMM/sys AR2+t
-------------------------+-----------------------------------------
L.lat | .08682621 .12304141 .15666965
| 3.48 4.01 2.86




L.rhe | -.33598307 -.3049613 -.63580419
| -4.25 -3.91 -4.35
L2.rhe | -.2310102 -.22526688 -.2757525
| -2.91 -2.82 -3.38
L.trhe | .08198568
| 2.60
L.she | . -.2753478 -.26055925 -.38839606
| -3.69 -3.59 -2.63
L2.she | .00261271 .01575334 .00070083




sargan | 58.210019 56.693932 45.612565
pvalue | .00600574 .00631852 .0338201
ar2 | .6345672 -.00027402 -.09192809
pvalue | .52571072 .99978137 .92675517
Inc.Sargan (stationarity)| 13.87
p-value | 0.459
N | 3386 3386 3386
-------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
Unrestricted VARs: Husband Wealth Causation
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |GMM/sys AR2 GMM/sys AR2+t GMM/sys AR3 GMM/sys AR3+t
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------
L.rhe | .60378929 .54671154 .6188075 .59583205
| 42.94 20.34 33.64 12.91
L2.rhe | .28124998 .27582347 .28022124 .27974245
| 17.33 16.69 12.63 12.29
L3.rhe | .10787651 .10625334
| 4.93 4.74
L.trhe | .01636966 .00573794
| 2.48 0.54
L.she | .02706955 .07920288 .00992538 .03732356
| 2.35 3.41 0.70 1.03
L2.she | -.00453287 -.00125598 -.00308909 -.00117116
| -0.30 -0.08 -0.17 -0.06
L.trhe | .01636966 .00573794
| 2.48 0.54
L.lat | -.00611869 -.00725368 -.00358149 -.00207318
| -1.63 -1.25 -0.80 -0.22
L2.lat | -.00719351 -.00716056 -.00327913 -.00350378
| -2.27 -2.14 -0.78 -0.76
L.tlat | .00036257 -.00049633
| 0.19 -0.17
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------
sargan | 59.234837 49.164443 19.023664 18.159522
p-value | .00336204 .01512204 .69985028 .57690055
ar2 | -2.7139655 -2.43876 . .
p-value | .00664831 .01473775 . .
Inc. Sargan | 4.99
p-value | 0.892
N_g | 3386 3386 3051 3051
-------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
47Unrestricted VARs: Wife Wealth Causation
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable |GMM/sys AR2 GMM/sys AR2+t GMM/sys AR3 GMM/sys AR3+t
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------
L.she | .60609805 .58154145 .58567953 .54622873
| 42.96 20.41 34.82 12.52
L2.she | .26998638 .26619826 .27075487 .26629275
| 15.96 15.46 12.96 12.55
L3.she | .08447082 .08054751
| 3.95 3.66
L.tshe | .00658477 .00969579
| 0.99 0.97
L.rhe | .02054481 .03430362 .01323375 .0604293
| 1.79 1.47 0.91 1.54
L2.rhe | .00028758 .00306656 -.00421798 .00229707
| 0.02 0.22 -0.23 0.12
L.trhe | -.00361276 -.01142702
| -0.61 -1.29
L.lat | .00083433 -.00302955 .00342754 .00825954
| 0.22 -0.49 0.71 0.83
L2.lat | .0001208 .00077505 -.00158227 -.00177526
| 0.04 0.26 -0.44 -0.47
L.tlat | .00137172 -.00129221
| 0.71 -0.48
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------
sargan | 56.18769 54.392847 32.428685 29.89194
p-value | .00714292 .00415534 .09155136 .07162365
ar2 | -1.1751966 -1.0587454 . .
p-value | .23991608 .28971573 . .
ar2 | -1.1751966 -1.0587454 . 10.47
p-value | .23991608 .28971573 . 0.401
N | 3386 3386 3051 3051
-------------------------------------------------------------------
legend: b/t
48